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ABSTRACT

Eugene Rostow (Yale University) and David Tarr (University of Wisconsin) present their views concerning the wisdom and validity of U.S. security policies, including SALT, and the adequacy of the country's political/military planning. Rostow, representing the views of the Committee on the Present Danger, believes that America is losing the capability of mounting a lethal second strike because it has permitted the nuclear balance to tilt against us. Unless the balance is restored, the United States will be unable to reach equitable or safe agreements with the Soviets. Tarr, invited by the Institute of World Affairs, stresses the profound effect of the U.S. descent from nuclear superiority to balance. In his view this parity has weakened the deterrent value of nuclear weapons for protection of our allies. The issue of SALT TWO has become less relevant compared to the juxtaposition of conventional arms and other areas of competition between the superpowers. Both speakers agreed that the Soviet Union does not want nuclear war. Rather, the USSR would prefer to have its adversary concede. (RM)

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UNITED STATES SECURITY AND SALT TWO

Report
of
A Wingspread Conference
convened by the
Committee on the Present Danger
and the
Institute of World Affairs
of
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
in cooperation with
The Johnson Foundation
Racine, Wisconsin
February 9, 1979

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FOREWORD

In June, 1978 The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee's Institute of World Affairs and the United States Department of State, with the cooperation of The Johnson Foundation, convened a conference on "United States Security and the Soviet Challenge." Because this meeting concentrated on the status of the proposed SALT TWO treaty, speakers included representatives from the United States Department of Defense and the United States Department of State, as well as Paul Warnke, then the nation's chief negotiator for the SALT TWO talks.

In order to present a differing analysis of the issue to essentially the same audience, an invitation was extended to the Committee on the Present Danger to present that organization's point of view. This was done in a spirit consistent with the principle of balanced dialogue at Wingspread meetings. The educational mission of The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee's Institute of World Affairs is equally dedicated to presenting differing points of view on issues of this kind. Ideally, diverse points of view are best presented at the same meeting, but for reasons of logistics it is not always possible, and a follow-up meeting is arranged in order to achieve balance.

Among persons invited to both meetings by The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee's Institute of World Affairs were members of the Wisconsin Citizens' Cabinet, a group of opinion leaders organized through the work of the Institute of World Affairs and The Johnson Foundation for the purpose of keeping citizens informed on foreign policy issues.

When the meeting with the Committee on the Present Danger was held in February, 1979, its timeliness occurred to all those present, given the then-recent visit to the United States of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the People's Republic of China. We were aware of the implications which the visit might have for United States-Soviet detente. However, it can be said that in any period it is important to offer opinion leaders balanced presentations of a timely topic, because we live in a climate of constant political, economic and social change.

Of all the foreign policy issues with which the United States' citizenry must be familiar and express its views for the consideration of government representatives, none is more important to the security of the nation than being sufficiently knowledgeable, complex as the issue is, to think through ways to prevent the unthinkable holocaust of a nuclear war.

In my welcome to participants at the Wingspread meeting reference was made to some of the conferences in which The Johnson Foundation has recently cooperated. The scope of these included:

- cooperation with the President's Commission on Mental Health,
- reducing urban youth unemployment,
- coping with changes in American family life,
- improving education in basic skills,
- prevention of child abuse,
- long-term care and the aging of America,
- wilderness preservation,
- formation of a National Coalition for Jail Reform,
- a planning meeting on the United Nations' Year of the Child.

It is appropriate for The Johnson Foundation to assist in convening specialists to discuss these subjects, but we must never forget that programs conducted to improve the human condition will count for nothing if we live under a cloud of fear that millions of lives may be lost and the physical environment become unlivable through nuclear destruction and contamination.

To think through and work out ways of preventing the unthinkable, while assuring United States security, is why two Wingspread meetings were held. We are indebted to the Committee on the Present Danger and the Institute of World Affairs of The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, including Professor Carol Baumann who was Chairperson for this presentation.

The Johnson Foundation, acting on policy set by the Trustees, will continue its role of advancing public understanding of this overriding issue through open and balanced dialogue, always hopeful that these endeavors may help, however modestly, to prevent the disaster which would result from the use of nuclear weapons.

Leslie Paffrath
President
The Johnson Foundation

INTRODUCTION

"... Unless we take urgent measures at once to reverse current trends, the Russians in a few years' time will have the capacity to fight a nuclear war — and to win such a war in the military sense of ending up in undisputed command of the battlefield and being in a position to dictate the peace."

Paul H. Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and member of the United States SALT delegation from 1969-1974.
May 7, 1978

In June, 1978 a group of Wisconsin civic leaders met for a briefing on the SALT TWO negotiations by chief United States SALT negotiator Paul C. Warnke and other United States government officials. The principal elements of the treaty expected to emerge from the talks were described. The Administration spokesmen argued that a stable strategic nuclear balance exists today and that the SALT TWO treaty, as proposed, was a sound, fair, verifiable agreement that would enhance United States security and place limits on the buildup of nuclear weapons.

Many thoughtful and concerned persons disagree. The other side of the coin in the developing national debate on SALT is the position that the Soviet Union is developing a strategic advantage that imperils the "second strike" capability of the United States; that this could lead to successful Russian nuclear blackmail or victory in an atomic war; that no treaty, including SALT TWO, could be successfully negotiated with the Soviets from such a position of weakness. In addition, opponents of SALT TWO believe the treaty would ratify a status of United States strategic disadvantage wherein the credibility of our nuclear deterrent would be reduced to the point where Soviet conventional military adventurism could be checked only with great difficulty.

With this in mind, the Committee on the Present Danger and the Institute of World Affairs of The University of Wisconsin in cooperation with The Johnson Foundation convened a meeting at Wingspread including those same Wisconsin civic leaders to hear the views of those who seriously question the wisdom and validity of current United States security policies — including SALT — and the adequacy of the Administration's political/military planning.

The University of Wisconsin's Dr. David Tarr, nationally known scholar of security policy and expert on strategic issues, appeared at the invitation of the Institute of World Affairs. Dr. Eugene Rostow of Yale University represented the Committee on the Present Danger.

In her opening remarks, Dr. Carol Edler Baumann, Director of the Institute of World Affairs, stressed the crucial nature of the SALT debate in terms of national security and the need for the contribution of informed citizens to the resolution of that debate.

Figure 1.
STRATEGIC RATIOS AND STRATEGIC DOCTRINES

Strategic Ratio		Strategic Doctrine
Superiority	→	Offensive Superiority
Advantage	→	Qualitative Superiority
Offsetting Advantages and Parity	→	Essential Equivalence and Assured Destruction
Inferiority	→	Minimum Deterrence

Figure 2.
STRATEGIC PARITY MODEL

United States \ U.S.S.R.	Cooperation	Competition
Cooperation →	Arms Control	U.S.S.R. Advantage
Competition →	United States Advantage	Arms Race

How to use the matrix above:
If the United States opts for cooperation and the U.S.S.R. for competition, the results would be **U.S.S.R. advantage**; if the United States and the U.S.S.R. both opt for competition, an **arms race** would result, and so forth.

FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE SALT TALKS: THE EMERGING STRATEGIC EQUATION

David W. Tarr

The task assigned to me today is impossible. I have been given forty minutes. I cannot speak on this topic for less than fifty minutes a day over an entire semester, but I will try. To facilitate this attempt I have designed two charts that may appear mysterious at first. They may remain a mystery after my comments, but I hope they will guide you through a conceptual analysis of our subject. The charts are: Figure 1, Strategic Ratios and Strategic Doctrines, and Figure 2, The Strategic Parity Model.

Since what I really would like to do is present a backdrop for a discussion of SALT TWO rather than to talk specifically about SALT ONE, SALT TWO and the technology and the politics involved, I have to engage in techniques of simplification and analysis in developing a conceptual scheme. It is the kind of scheme that might drive historians up the wall, but political scientists enjoy an ignorance of history sufficient to permit them to make such generalizations with confidence.

I will attempt to cover the period from 1945 to the present in terms of the evolving strategic equation. I would like to say something substantive about this, but there really is not time. So what I have done is to identify four possible power ratios that might obtain between the United States and the Soviet Union (See Figure 1): (a) superiority, (b) advantage, (c) offsetting advantages and/parity, and (d) inferiority. From 1945 to the present we have experienced all of these ratios except that, in my judgment, the United States has not been in the position of inferiority—yet. This is to say, we began the period of the Cold War with clear military superiority, at least in terms of strategic power, long-range nuclear weapons and the capacity to inflict serious harm upon the homeland of the Soviet Union. We have tried to maintain that superiority over a substantial period of time. However, over time the power ratio changed to advantage and, more recently, to parity.

David W. Tarr, Professor of Political Science at The University of Wisconsin-Madison engages in research and teaching in areas of United States foreign policy, strategic issues, and security studies. He received a Rockefeller Grant in 1977 for a project on arms control and disarmament carried out at the Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs. Dr. Tarr is the author of American Strategy in the Nuclear Age and co-editor of Modules in Security Studies.

At the outset, of course, the United States had a monopoly of atomic power. It had a virtual monopoly of delivery systems because it had a long-range air reach, and it had overseas bases from which it could strike the Soviet Union in a way the Soviet Union could not match. That atomic monopoly ceased in 1949 when the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic device. Then a phase which is largely characterized by American nuclear superiority began. In the 1960's there began to be an erosion of what almost any analyst would regard as strategic superiority. This was largely a result of American decisions not to add to its strategic arsenal, but is also due to the Soviet thrust to catch up with the United States in nuclear weaponry. By the late 1960's, the power ratio is thus better characterized as "strategic advantage" for the United States rather than strategic superiority. Now I could give you a nominal definition of "superiority" that might satisfy Henry Kissinger (who of course has asked "what in God's name is superiority?"), and I could give you a nominal definition of "advantage." However, the real nub of the issue here is the **operational** definition. In specific military capabilities, and posture, what constitutes "superiority" and "advantage"?

Unfortunately, I will have to gloss over that, because, in fact, it involves a very complex argument involving interpretations of the significance of specific weapons systems on both sides. Suffice it to say that the United States once enjoyed strategic "superiority" in a meaningful military sense of that word. President Nixon, of all people, was the first president to abandon the use of the term, instead adopting a policy of "sufficiency." In short, by 1969-1970, we appear to have arrived at nuclear parity. I think it is better to think in terms of "offsetting advantages" rather than "parity," because we are dealing with an asymmetrical relationship and the asymmetries in the strategic equation are important, although they make the debate difficult to comprehend. In effect, we are comparing Soviet oranges with American apples and trying to come up with so-called "rough equivalence" of strategic forces. There are those who have said that we have slipped into a position of strategic inferiority. I will not address that question at this moment; I simply indicate that I have put it on the list because it is not only a possibility, but because the other party in the strategic equation (the Soviet Union) was once, in fact, in such a position. Also, there is a point of view and a strategic doctrine in the United States which justifies and advocates strategic inferiority for us.

In Figure 1 in the column to the right there are doctrines which match the strategic ratios. These doctrines are descriptions of particular strategic relationships. There are more doctrines than I have listed and there are some I do not know where to locate. For example, I do not know where to place "limited counterforce"—which was a doctrine introduced formally in 1974 by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. I do not know whether it is more appropriate to "strategic advantage" or to "offsetting advantages and parity." At any rate, it seemed useful to this presentation to try to

match up these two columns.

As I have indicated, the United States has gone through stages from "strategic superiority" through "strategic advantage" down to "parity" of strategic power. In reviewing these phases we need to analyze the underlying policies that reflected the shifts in the strategic equation within which we were assured both then and now that nuclear deterrence continued to be effective and stable.

To analyze the logic of these policies, I have constructed two "models" of deterrence, if you will—two different conceptions of deterrence which are quite distinct. The first one is simple. I call it the Cold War, or supremacy, model. In general, deterrence includes two ideas: one is a rational calculation that war is unprofitable; the other is the more emotional factor—fear of punitive attack. In other words, deterrence discourages war by military threat that either convinces an adversary that the consequences would be unacceptable, or more basically, simply frightens the adversary. In the Cold War model, the interesting thing—both in the public sector and to a large degree among many analysts in universities—is that the question of intentions of the two strategic competitors was not regarded as a serious problem. The orthodox description of the Cold War situation was that the United States was the defender of peace, freedom and the status quo, and that the Soviet Union was an aggressor—expansive and dangerous. Therefore, the defending, or status quo power, had the role in international relations of maintaining stability and peace through deterrence. The aggressive intentions of the Soviets were clear, rather than open to question; the conclusions were obvious. Strategic supremacy was necessary. That is, the greater the strategic advantage the United States had over the Soviet Union, the better deterrence was assumed to work. The reverse was also the case; for example, people became concerned when American strategic power was believed to be slipping under the alleged complacency of Eisenhower, when the so-called missile gap arose.

As the Soviet Union began to catch up, a second conception of strategic deterrence was needed to justify Soviet gains in terms of the strategic position of the United States. This resulted in a very substantial debate in the 1960's. I am sorry that debate is over, because most of the interesting options then under consideration have disappeared or gone beyond the fringe of strategic debate of today. The resulting consensus makes me uncomfortable.

Unlike the Cold War model, which is simple, the second deterrent model is complex. I call it the "Strategic Parity Model" (Figure 2). This is represented by a matrix that shows the strategic interdependence of weapons and armaments decisions on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union. It simplifies these decisions by reducing the strategic choices of each nation to two options: "cooperation," and "competition." We could pursue, and we have pursued policies of cooperation with the Soviet Union. Some of these policies have been, in fact, unilateral. For example, Secretary of Defense McNamara decided not to increase strategic missile launchers beyond the numbers deployed in 1967. He made this decision and also generally opposed deployment of strategic defenses, such as the anti-ballistic missile system, on the grounds that such actions might provoke Soviet responses that were counterproductive. Indeed the assured destruction doctrine with which Secretary McNamara is identified is, in fact, a unilateral American effort to enlist cooperation by inducing the Soviet Union to engage in this madness with us, thus making it Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). That is, both sides "cooperate" by not defending their own cities and by not targeting their opponent's strategic forces—thus producing a bizarre form of strategic stability based on the mutual vulnerability of their populations.

As my matrix indicated (Figure 2), if we both simultaneously choose cooperative policies, the most likely result would be "arms control"—an agreed reduction of strategic weapons. On the other hand, we both might choose to compete. Strategic competition is characterized by weapons decisions and deployments that seek to gain advantages over the other side. Here, there are interesting incentives for each side, whether we assume aggressive intent or not. That is, there are strong incentives for both to choose competition and advantage, over cooperation. For example, there is a **defensive** incentive—we fear the other side may deploy weapons systems that give them significant advantage in military and political capability, resulting in grave strategic disadvantages to our side. To offset those possibilities, our research and development programs pursue qualitative improvements in weapons to prevent this result. A similar incentive exists on the other side as well. This is further complicated by the fact that a decision to develop a weapon and deploy it requires a long "lead time," forcing us and the Soviets to engage in anticipatory competitive decisions with respect to each other.

The matrix (Figure 2) shows four possible outcomes of decision. If both sides choose to cooperate, presumably we could have arms control or even disarmament. If both sides choose to compete, the result is an arms race. But the most interesting set of variables is when one side chooses one option and the other side the other. If we were to cooperate—and it appears that our policy preference since the beginning of SALT has been in this direction—and the Soviet Union were to compete by means of a crash "Manhattan Project" to develop a new type of strategic weapon, we could find ourselves confronted with a Soviet advantage. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union were to cooperate in the strategic realm and the United States were to push hard to gain an advantage (i.e. "compete"), the Soviet Union might find itself back in a position of strategic inferiority. In short, while each side has only two choices (cooperation and competition), there are at least three incentives: **Defensive** incentives exist on both sides to prevent the other side from achieving advantages. Secondly there are **offensive** incentives for each has good reason

to feel more secure if the other side's military capabilities are inferior. Finally there are **cooperative** incentives, because the present strategic situation is extremely dangerous. It is also a costly situation. There are those in both societies who would like to reallocate resources to programs other than those of defense. Moreover competitive relationships usually increase tensions; there are many who want to reduce tensions between the two sides. So cooperation is an important incentive for both governments.

In actual practice we find a mixture of incentives and choices. What I suggest is going on today, in terms of my conceptual scheme, is that both sides are orchestrating strategies—cooperation and competition. Therefore, one of the more difficult problems for our policy makers is to identify the other side's cooperative and competitive intentions and actions. I will try to analyze that in the few minutes we have left. I will also try to do something which is probably a little uncomfortable for some of us—that is, to use my matrix to identify positions in the current strategic debate. For example, I am going to try to show where the Committee on the Present Danger fits on the matrix.

If we go back to the four ratios—strategic superiority (or supremacy,) strategic advantage, parity, and inferiority, we see that they can be intrinsically confusing. For example, could the Russians recognize a distinction between the "cold war supremacy" model and the new model of strategic parity, represented by the matrix, in which we seek only "strategic advantage" through qualitative superiority? How could the Russians distinguish between these two objectives? On the other hand, how can the United States know whether the Soviet Union is simply seeking to maintain parity or whether it really has adopted an aggressive posture as is suggested by the cold war model? There are those in our society who still advocate supremacy. They argue that the Soviet Union is an inherent threat to the West militarily, politically, and ideologically.

Let us turn to the next category: A push for "strategic advantage" is probably a basic objective of people like Senator Henry Jackson and the Committee on the Present Danger. That is to say, what really concerns some analysts is the possibility that the Soviet Union will gain significant strategic war-fighting advantages, which will lead to bolder Soviet policies and contribute to the erosion of the Western alliance. In this event, should war occur, the Soviets might have a significant military advantage on the battlefield. Such advantage might leave the United States incapable or unwilling to act (deterred), or actually defeated.

Do those on the Committee on the Present Danger and others, including Senator Jackson, really want an American advantage? I am sure they would accept it. It is more comfortable. Moreover, since we are the deterring and status quo power, we have no interest in territorial or other acquisitions, so an American advantage would not endanger others; it would reinforce deterrence. But it does, of course, suggest the same underlying logic as the cold war model of strategic supremacy.

The next category is nuclear parity. Parity has become a popular concept. According to the spokesmen in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the State Department, it is the best strategic outcome. In my interviews with members of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, I have been impressed by the degree to which they appear to be concerned more about the fueling of the arms race from our domestic process than from the international competition which I am addressing here. Arms control to them appears to involve dampening the enthusiasm and spirit for new armaments in the United States. They would like to retard the production of **new** weapons systems, while holding the overall levels of strategic weapons fairly high in order to maintain a stable balance based on mutual assured destruction. This, as I have explained, is regarded as essentially a cooperative strategy.

And now the fourth category: What about "inferiority?" Are there any people in our society who advocate strategic inferiority? Well, such a belief has persisted in some sectors through most periods of strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Many feel that there is "no place to hide," and that at a certain level of nuclear conflict, it is all over. In this view, strategic thinking stops when deterrence fails. From this perspective the basic requirement is simple: have "enough" strategic weapons to harm your adversary at a certain level. It use to be called "finite deterrence." For example, according to this doctrine, all you would need to deter the Soviet Union is a fleet of, say, ten submarines, with 16 missiles each. Such a finite force would be sufficient to destroy an "unacceptable" number of Soviet cities—thus, the Russians would be deterred even though they have a much larger strategic force of their own.

Before closing, I would like to raise some questions about perceptions. I have indicated that it is difficult for adversaries to trust each other. Neither side can easily determine whether the other is just seeking to offset potential advantages it sees down the road, or whether it is confronted with a significant attempt to gain supremacy. We do not know, for example, whether the Russians, having surpassed us in important categories of strategic power in the early 1970's, are going to stop. or level off in more significant ways that SALT TWO provides. The "worst case" analyst is going to say, "Well, let's take a look at what they could do to us if this trend continues." That picture can be very sobering. If, as some believe, the Soviets are seeking superiority, what does that mean to us? What is the real significance of supremacy when we already have such large numbers of nuclear weapons? The answer, at least for a number of analysts, appears to be that even if it doesn't matter **militarily** that we fall slightly behind the Soviet Union, **politically** it is very significant. This argument suggests that the most important element in military power is political influence, and if your military status in the world shifts from superiority to equality

or to slight disadvantage, allies and others will begin to get the message, and begin to make accommodations to the other powers of the world. Thus, American influence in the world would diminish in detectable ways. There are those who say that this has been happening. The Soviet Union explains this in terms of a "correlation of forces" moving against us, and believes it is an inevitable historical process. There are those in this country who say we have contributed to this process by not making the right decisions in the strategic, political, and economic realms. So perceptions of power and status can be important.

Finally, there is the question of what to do when deterrence fails and why we should be seriously concerned about that. I haven't really made up my mind about the directions of the Carter Administration in strategic weaponry and and policy. I am impressed in a nonpartisan sense with the inadequacy of American strategic thought. Basically, while most strategic thinking and analysis goes a little bit beyond deterrence, it does not go very far. Deterrence theory itself is a series of revolving paradoxes that are embedded in American strategic policy. Unfortunately, our declaratory statements about the use of military power in the event of the breakdown of peace are not very credible, because we claim we will do the least reasonable thing. We puzzle our adversaries and perhaps sometimes our friends by the statements we make. For example, we say we will commit nuclear suicide in defense of Europe. That is, we claim we will strike Soviet cities, knowing full well that the Russians will respond by destroying ours. But why should we retaliate against Soviets cities in a response to an attack on NATO? We can all understand in terms of deterrence, that if the Russians fear the loss of their industrial and populations centers, such a threat will give them pause. But if you take the next step and ask why the United States would do that if deterrence fails, attacking cities does not make sense. It does not make sense, because the logical response to the military attack is military defense, not a punitive attack against civilians that would doubtless result in a Soviet reply in kind. Military defense requires "counterforce" responses. This does not necessarily mean striking Soviet missile silos, but it does suggest countering the **military** forces of the attacker. To approach the problem in these terms is to extend strategic thought beyond deterrence. In the Soviet Union it is fairly clear that such thinking is taking place in a very professional way. The functional view in the Soviet Union is that the Soviet foreign ministry seeks to deter the "imperialists" from launching a war. But, if a war occurs, it is then up to Soviet military forces to bring about a favorable outcome. Thus, Soviet nuclear strategy includes concepts of fighting and winning. There is much less of this in the United States. Instead, in our view, once deterrence fails we are inclined to go "all out." We have adopted a posture which reinforces this conceptual broadjump. "Assured destruction" guarantees the highest level of cataclysm that we can construct in order to **prevent** war from occurring. It is an unhappy paradox that makes nuclear war unthinkable but not impossible. Certainly if I were president, that is the last button I would push, and I probably would not push it, because it would be irrevelant in that stage of the military process.

To sum up, we need to take much more into account the problem of deterrence failure. On this issue—the adequacy of the American strategic posture—the critics of SALT TWO are in a strong position. They have found an important weakness in the American strategic position, and they have attacked it. I do not find the response of the proponents of SALT TWO to have a very effective answer.

I hope these remarks have set the stage for Dean Rostow's presentation.

SALT TWO — CATCH 22

Eugene V. Rostow

First, I should like to thank the Institute of World Affairs of The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and The Johnson Foundation for the honor of their invitation to Wingspread. It is my first visit to this famous and beautiful place.

Before beginning my prepared remarks, I should like to comment on the terms "cold war" and "detente" which all three previous speakers have used in a familiar way. They are terms in common usage. But I believe their ordinary meaning is misleading. The cold war is not over; it continues, indeed, it is warmer than ever. The Soviet-American relation has not changed in character since 1917 nor has any appreciable detente been achieved. There was no relaxation of tension when President Nixon announced in 1972 that the cold war was over and that confrontation had been replaced by negotiation. Since 1972, the cold war has been very much worse than ever before. Recent confrontations in the Far East, the Middle East, and now in the Persian Gulf and in Africa make the Berlin crisis and the thrusts and threats against Greece and Iran of the late forties look like child's play. But we persist in telling ourselves and, worse still, in believing that the cold war is over, and has been replaced by something more benign called "detente."

My former colleague Paul Warnke spoke here last June in defense of the SALT TWO Treaty. He said that the Treaty, which has been anticipated nearly every week since October, 1977, should be judged only in terms of its contribution to the security of the United States. I agree with that premise, although both the President and the Secretary of State do not. They contend that the SALT agreement will improve our overall **political** relationship with the Soviet Union. And they claim also that SALT TWO will save us money, by making it possible to reduce our defense budget. Indeed, Mr. Warnke himself sometimes speaks of the SALT Treaty as a contribution to "detente," a mysterious and undefined term which has been tormenting the American mind ever since it was proclaimed in 1972. And he has occasionally said that SALT TWO would save us money, although he has also said that the financial consequence of SALT could not be quantified.

Eugene V. Rostow, Sterling Professor of Law at the Yale University Law School, is Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Committee on the Present Danger. He is the former Dean of the Yale Law School. A nationally known spokesman on strategic issues, Dr. Rostow served as Under Secretary of State of Political Affairs from 1966 to 1969 in the Johnson administration.

But let me start with Mr. Warnke's position in his lecture here, that the SALT TWO Treaty, as it is now projected, would enhance the security of the United States.

For the benefit of those of you who did not hear Mr. Warnke last June, let me summarize his argument. I shall deal with four of his five points in the course of my talk. One I shall discuss at this stage.

Mr. Warnke's case for SALT rested on four theses: (1) that there is a stable strategic balance today, in that neither side could initiate a nuclear war without facing the certainty of devastating retaliation. Assuming for the moment that there is a stable strategic balance today - and I do not agree with Mr. Warnke on this - would it be better to preserve the balance by unrestricted competition in the development of nuclear arms, or through an agreement that would limit and then reverse the nuclear arms build-up, providing the same kind of security at lower cost? On these assumptions, no one could disagree with Mr. Warnke's choice of the second option. Certainly I do not. The question is whether SALT TWO could accomplish his goal. (2) Mr. Warnke's second contention is that it would. Mr. Warnke says that the Treaty would establish equal ceilings for both sides, and reductions in nuclear power hereafter. Thus, he says, it would preserve the balance, and make it impossible for either side to contemplate a first nuclear strike. (3) Third, he contends, the terms of the Treaty can be verified by national means; compliance would not depend on trust of the Soviet Union. (4) And fourth, the Treaty would preserve the military options we believe are necessary to maintain the balance. With these three points I disagree, for reasons I shall try to explain hereafter. Mr. Warnke's fifth and final point is a rather touching one - that our negotiating positions in the bargaining have been determined not by him alone, but by an interagency coordinating committee representing all the concerned departments in Washington. I have had a good deal of experience with interdepartmental coordination in Washington. All I can say is that I cannot share his faith in the process as a method for achieving wisdom.

While Mr. Warnke and I agree that the SALT TWO Treaty should be judged on security grounds, I define the term "national security" more broadly than Mr. Warnke does. He spoke here as if the only problem of our security in the field of nuclear weapons is to guarantee us against the risk of a possible nuclear attack on the United States itself. He made some passing reference to NATO, but he did not really analyze the implications of Soviet nuclear policy for the defense of Europe. And he did not mention the bearing of Soviet nuclear strength on the problem of defending our interests in other parts of the world, whether by conventional or nuclear means. If you think of the headlines of the past few weeks, you will see at once the importance of the point I am trying to make. The United States and many other countries are alarmed about the fate of Iran, and the possibility that the whole area from Pakistan and Afghanistan to the states of the Persian Gulf and

the Horn of Africa could fall under Soviet control. The President has just announced our concern about the threat to Thailand, and has reminded the world that Thailand is protected by the SEATO Treaty, the Treaty of Manila. Those words have an ominous echo. And the brilliant Chinese Vice-Premier, Teng Hsiao-ping, has been speaking here with great force about the nature and weight of Soviet foreign policy, and the arms which sustain it.

These are the real elements of "linkage" between the SALT TWO Treaty and other aspects of our foreign policy. By "linkage" I do not mean connecting our consideration of the SALT TWO Treaty to the way the Soviet Union treats its own citizens. I should not link the SALT Treaty to the human rights question, deeply as I feel about violations of human rights. But SALT cannot be treated in isolation from the problem of proxy wars, and Soviet campaigns to enlarge its empire by other means. Even if SALT TWO provided for as much nuclear stability and verifiability as Mr. Warnke believes, even if it allowed us all the military options we shall need to restore the nuclear balance, it would be of no use to us if it were a license for Soviet expansion at will through the use of conventional military force, proxy wars, subversion, or nuclear threats.

In short, we cannot answer the question Mr. Warnke posed without first deciding what our military establishment is for. Does it exist only to repel invasions of the United States? To keep the United States, Western Euope, and perhaps Japan as safe enclaves while the rest of the world sinks into anarchy? That is the question we must face, I believe, before we can reach a prudent conclusion about SALT TWO.

The SALT TWO Treaty is intelligible only in its setting of American foreign and security policy as a whole: Soviet-American relations are the main problem of our foreign and defense policy, and the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States is the most important structural element in that relationship. The Soviet Union is engaged in a program of indefinite expansion, based on an arms build-up without precedent in this century. Unless we retain our nuclear second-strike capability, which is one of the few self-evident phrases in the arcane vocabulary of the nuclear problem, we shall be unable to contain, deter, or defeat Soviet expansion when it threatens our national interests. For present purposes, I should define that term as the preservation of the balance of power on which our national security ultimately depends. Obviously, the balance of power requires us to protect the independence of the states of Western Europe and Japan. But the concept cannot be sharply limited. Many other states will be of great importance to our security, depending upon their context in the Soviet drive for power. Facing Soviet nuclear superiority, the threat to use our theatre or indeed our strategic nuclear forces in defense of our interests would lose all credibility. If we allow such a situation to develop, we should be in the position the Soviet Union occupied during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and we should face the grim choice between accommodation or destruction. No American President should be put in such a position. The ratification of the SALT TWO Treaty therefore requires the Senate and the nation at long last to face the task of redefining our national interests in the aftermath of Vietnam, and adopting a foreign policy and a military posture capable of protecting them.

Between President Truman's time immediately after World War II and the revulsion against Vietnam during the last decade, we had a reasonably coherent foreign policy, which was supported by a strong bipartisan majority of the American people. Its main features are familiar: First, there was the network of programs, starting with the Marshall Plan, through which we helped to restore the industrialized democracies and knit them into a dynamic worldwide capitalist economy. Between 1947 and the early 'seventies, when the international monetary system collapsed, these policies were eminently successful, helping the entire free world to achieve high rates of growth and social progress under reasonably stable conditions. Secondly, we supported decolonization, and initiated programs of economic and technical assistance to the developing nations, most of them newly liberated from imperial rule. Here the record of success has been uneven, but many developing nations, from Taiwan, Malaysia, and South Korea to Mexico, Brazil, and, until recently, Iran have made striking advances as integral parts of the economy of the industrialized democracies. Third, we developed bilateral and multilateral policies of international cooperation to encourage social and political development, education and cultural improvement, and the self-determination of peoples. And finally, we conducted a long, patient, and thus far unsuccessful campaign to bring nuclear weapons and nuclear technology under international control. That campaign was launched in 1947 with our offer of the Baruch Plan, which the Soviet Union rejected. SALT TWO is the most recent stage of the American effort to eliminate nuclear weapons from world politics, and to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses.

The possibility of success in these four sectors of our foreign policy depended upon the achievement of a state of general peace, based on reciprocal acceptance of the rules of world public order codified in the Charter of the United Nations. For the men and women of the first post-war generation, who had lived through the failure of the League of Nations to stop aggression in the 'Thirties, it was self-evident that peace was indivisible, in Maxim Litvinov's phrase. They believed that the way to prevent the scourge of large-scale war on this small, interdependent, and infinitely dangerous planet was to outlaw all war, and to insist on the enforcement of the rules of the Charter, either through the institutions of the United Nations, or, if they did not work, through arrangements of collective self-defense like NATO and our other regional security treaties.

The development of this policy, the predicate for every other aspect of

our foreign policy, started with the Truman Doctrine immediately after World War II, when it became clear that the Soviet Union was marching to a different drummer - when it pursued expansionist goals in Eastern Europe, Iran, Greece, and Turkey, and rejected the Marshall Plan, the Baruch Plan, and proposals to develop the Security Council as an effective peace-keeping institution. We sought the goal of general peace in this sense with considerable success in the successive post-war crises over Iran, Berlin, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, Korea, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, maintaining a balance of power in world politics, and - except for Eastern Europe - a considerable degree of respect for the rules of the Charter.

The commitment of the Western nations to the ideas of the Truman Doctrine began to weaken after the Korean War, and weakened a great deal during and after the war in Indo-China. A new generation had grown up, a generation which had not known Pharoah. And people began to say there must be a better way to keep the peace than through such bitter and expensive wars as Korea and Vietnam. But no new policies emerged to replace those which had become so unpopular. And so, at the moment, we remain committed to the old policies, but without conviction or enthusiasm, adrift and uncertain while aggressions increase in number and importance throughout the world. The United States reacts by doing nothing, saying "We are not the world's policeman," and asking "How does it affect us if war occurs in some distant place we hardly know?" As a result, the fearful specter of anarchy has become more and more powerful as a factor of international life and as a force in men's minds. It is a striking comment on the trend of the times that a number of new books and articles have begun again to address the problem of world public order.

One can chart the disintegration of world order, and the relationship between nuclear and conventional military power and politics, by recalling some of the key elements of our experience since 1945.

Despite the Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan, the goal of our nuclear policy was, and has remained, to prevent nuclear weapons from being used or brandished in world politics. It is a sound goal which I for one strongly support. The implication of that goal is that developments should prevent either side from achieving a position in which it could gain a great advantage by a first nuclear strike. World politics should not be exposed to such temptations. But the neutralization of nuclear weapons in that limited sense cannot become an excuse authorizing the Soviet Union to expand at will through the use of conventional weapons, subversion, or nuclear threats, When such events occur, the second objective of our nuclear policy comes into play. It is to supplement our political influence and conventional arms in deterring or stopping Soviet-sponsored aggression directed against our interests. This is why retaining a credible second-strike capability is necessarily an essential goal of our security policy.

This second purpose of our nuclear arsenal has become steadily more obvious as the Soviet Union became a nuclear power, and then a strong nuclear power. The mission of our nuclear forces goes beyond making it too expensive for the Soviet Union to consider launching a nuclear attack against the United States. They must also provide a nuclear guaranty for our interests in many parts of the world, and make it possible for us to defend those interests by diplomacy or by the use of theatre military forces whenever such action becomes necessary.

The Soviet doctrine with regard to the use of nuclear weapons is quite different. As we are finally beginning to realize, the Soviet Union is not interested in mutual deterrence and nuclear stalemate. The Soviet Union never accepted our Quixotic view of the problem of nuclear arms. And they never joined us in cutting back on nuclear arms development. We often talk of an arms race. As Professor Albert Wohlstetter has shown, there has been no arms race. It takes two to race. The Soviet Union has been racing. We have not. Secretary of Defense Brown uses the metaphor of the tortoise and the hare. It is apt. We were ahead. We decided to sit under a tree. But they have kept on racing. To the Soviets, clear nuclear superiority is the ultimate weapon of coercive diplomacy - the Queen of their chess set, through which they think they could achieve checkmate without having to fight either a nuclear or a conventional war. And if accident or miscalculation should lead to full scale nuclear war, the Soviets believe they are prepared to fight and win.

It became obvious even before the end of World War II that the American nuclear monopoly could not be used to prevent many forms of Soviet expansion. In the hope of achieving Soviet-American cooperation, we deferred to the Soviet Union's strategic interest in having a buffer zone of client states in Eastern Europe. We did nothing when the Soviet Union took over Poland, Czechoslavia, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary immediately after the war, and crushed rebellions against Soviet control in 1948, 1953, 1956, and 1968. Nor could American nuclear superiority alone prevent the Soviet Union from using conventional forces, at least against targets they think we regard as secondary, like Korea, Vietnam, or Ethiopia. In most such situations, except for massive attacks on our most vital interests, like Western Europe or Japan, defense has to be provided by conventional forces in the first instance. But the absence of effective American nuclear deterrence - that is, the erosion or neutralization of our second-strike capacity - would deny all credibility to our **conventional** force deterrent. The nuclear balance has been the decisive factor in all the crises of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States between 1945 and the present day.

In the early post-war years, when we had a nuclear monopoly, and then overwhelming nuclear superiority, we were able to deal satisfactorily, although at steadily increasing cost, with a long series of

Soviet managed thrusts, from the early moves against Iran, Greece, and Turkey to the Berlin Airlift, the threat to Yugoslavia, the war in Korea, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and recurrent Soviet efforts in the Middle East and Africa.

In the Berlin Airlift, for example, the shadow of our nuclear monopoly kept the Soviets from firing on the allied planes and then persuaded them to give up the blockade. The exercise became too risky when we demonstrated our willingness to insist on our rights. In Korea, despite our nuclear monopoly at that time, we used only conventional forces. But veiled nuclear threats, altogether credible after the long and bitter war, persuaded the North Koreans to come to Panmunjom in the first place, and then brought those fantastic negotiations at least to the point of an armistice which has held for more than twenty years.

The essence of the problem is illustrated by the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. There, the Soviet Union secretly undertook to introduce land-based nuclear missiles into Cuba, in violation of their assurances to us, and in the face of private and public warnings from the President of the United States. Such action would have altered the basic equation of nuclear deterrence, and gravely affected the credibility and effectiveness of American diplomatic warnings to the Soviet Union. At that time, we had unchallengeable nuclear superiority. If there had been a nuclear exchange, the Soviet Union would have suffered about 100 million casualties and the United States 10 million. We had equally obvious conventional-force superiority in the area. If we had invaded Cuba, the Soviet Union could not have opposed the invasion effectively with either conventional or nuclear forces. By mobilizing an invasion force in Florida and instituting a limited naval blockade of Cuba, we convinced the Soviets that the risks were too great, and they withdrew their missiles.

Since the late 50's, the Soviet Union has been engaged in a massive military buildup, both in nuclear and conventional forces, designed to reverse the nuclear relationship which determined the outcome of the Berlin airlift, the Korean War, and Cuban Missile Crisis.

The first result of that buildup was evident in Vietnam. In the late 60's and early 70's, our nuclear superiority was no longer so evident as it had been at the time of the Cuban missile crisis; indeed, superiority had given way to stalemate. Therefore, the hints which brought the Korean war to an end could no longer determine the course of events in Indo-China. We tried to repeat the Korean scenario for Vietnam. But it didn't work. The nuclear balance had changed too much.

This is the ultimate moral of Vietnam. The deterioration of our nuclear advantage led to the erosion of our position and profoundly affected the final stages of the conflict.

At the moment, our policy is inhibited - nearly paralyzed - by these changes in the balance of nuclear and conventional power. In 1958, we and the British moved forces into Lebanon and Jordan, and ended a Soviet-backed threat to take over both countries without firing a shot. When the same kind of threat was mounted against Lebanon in 1977, we did not seriously consider using even a parade of force to save Lebanon from destruction.

There can be no question that since Vietnam our nuclear position has slipped from stalemate to the borders of inferiority. While the experts argue about whether we are already inferior to the Soviet Union in overall nuclear power, they are agreed that if present trends continue we shall be significantly inferior - and soon. Some careful studies contend that the strategic force relationships which dominated the Cuban missile crisis will soon be reversed unless we undertake a crash program immediately — that in the event of a nuclear exchange we should risk 100 million casualties and the Soviet Union 10 million. Even if the figure were 100 to 20 or 30, as the C.I.A. has estimated, it is not difficult to anticipate what would happen if we were to allow such a situation to develop. A perceptive student of the problem has remarked that, confronting such a scenario, even General Curtis LeMay would advise "accommodation." Our foreign policy and our conventional forces would be impotent, and we should acquiesce.

It is the first objective of Soviet policy to achieve such a situation — with its implications for nuclear coercion. This - not nuclear war itself - is what our nuclear-weapons program and the SALT negotiations are about.

For the last six years or so, my conversations with those responsible for the policy of governments all over the world have been concerned with one question above all others - "What has happened to American foreign policy?" With anxiety now approaching panic, these men and women are preoccupied with a series of question they consider the key to the future: "Will it take another Pearl Harbor to induce the United States to restore a realistic and affirmative foreign policy? Have Americans lost their national pride, and even their instinct for self-preservation? Don't they understand the Soviet rush for power? Or have they decided to surrender, and make the best of Finlandization, as the prime Soviet supplier of food and high technology - on credit? Could it possibly be true, as some have said, that the American people have become decadent; that the United States has 'passed its historic high point like so many earlier civilizations, and cannot be roused by political challenge,'; and that the task of the American government is therefore to persuade the Russians to give it the best available deal?"

Those who discuss these questions among themselves, or put them to trusted visitors, are not interested in the answers as spectators or students of history. They know that the fate of their countries and their own careers, perhaps their lives are at stake. When they reach conclusions about whether the winner of the struggle will be the Soviet Union or the United States, they act. Pakistan, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, among other states, are visibly disengaging from the United States,

and moving towards accommodation with the Soviet Union. They risk nothing from such a posture if we should in the end prevail. And they do not want their people to go through the experience of Ethiopia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Iran if our retreat to isolation should continue.

At the moment, we necessarily occupy the perch of the eagle, but we are trying to indulge in the posture of the ostrich. While the United States hides its head in sand, still caught up in the unresolved contradictions of its post-Vietnam mood, the Soviet Union is methodically seizing one strategic position after another, from Vietnam to a long list of former British, French, and Portugese colonies in Africa and the Middle East, in a pattern Admiral Mahan would have admired. Since 1974, the Soviet Union has greatly enlarged its spheres of influence.

The pattern of Soviet imperial expansion is not ambiguous. It can mean only the Soviet envelopment of Europe, the detachment of Japan and China from the American orbit, and the achievement of a status of domination from which the Soviet Union could isolate and coerce the United States itself. As high Soviet leaders say, their goal is a position of "visible military superiority," which will permit them to determine "the future course of world politics." Nothing could bring out the implications of this development more vividly than the fact that on December 7, 1978, President Carter yielded to a public Soviet warning not to help Iran in its agony. The President's statement was a startling, nearly unbelievable event. Coupled with our uncertain and ineffective behavior during the Iranian convulsion, it means that the United States has given up the advantage of uncertainty, one of the most powerful deterrent forces in international politics. And it implies the possible abandonment of an ally of exceptional geo-political importance, whose destiny will determine that of Saudi Arabia and the smaller states of the Persian Gulf, and therefore of many other states as well. Soviet control of the oil resources of the area, its space, and the near-by seas is not a prospect we can accept. Among many other consequences, it would doom the high hopes we have placed in the Camp David Agreements.

While the Soviet Union moves ahead with stunning speed, backed by military power which is now superior to our own in most categories, and growing more than twice as fast, the United States remains paralyzed by doubts about how to define its national interests in world politics, and what it must do to protect them.

A variety of factors impedes clarity of thought.

In the media, the issues are debated in terms of slogans and shibboleths which bear no relation to reality. For the moment, "No more Vietnams" is a battle-cry as potent as "No more Koreas" was in the 50's. The perennial American yearning for our nineteenth century posture of isolation and neutrality has been given new life by the catastrophe of Vietnam. Well meaning Americans contend that we should help only democratic nations which respect human rights - a small and diminishing group; they forget our alliance with Stalin against Hitler, our rapprochment with China to balance the Soviet Union, and many other practical policies made necessary by reality. The hardy faith of pacifism continues to flourish, in the midst of a militarized world. Genuine Communists and their fellow travellers still rally the innocents, their influence apparently undiminished by the repeated betrayals of the God who Failed.

But most American opinion remains practical, level-headed, and intensely loyal to the nation. It is deeply confused, however, by one fundamental element of the situation: with a few notable exceptions, our leaders are not leading. Are they fulfilling Kissinger's policy that the facts about Soviet power and policy of expansion must be "concealed" from the American people while the government negotiates "the best deal it can get"?

President Carter has said we should not base our foreign policy on "an inordinate fear" of Soviet power, but he does not explain how to distinguish reasonable from "inordinate" concern with the problem. Last spring, he told the North Atlantic Council in London that the Soviet military position is "aggressive" in nature, and could not be explained by considerations of defense. He repeated that comment in a number of later speeches. But during the fall he told a much larger audience on American television that Soviet policy is defensive in character, and that it represents only an exaggerated and hypersensitive concern about Soviet security. He added that the United States is and will remain stronger than the Soviet Union; and that the Soviet Union is not seeking military superiority, or the power to threaten the United States or its allies with destruction we could not match. In this judgment, the President rejects the conclusion of the 1978 National Intelligence Estimate, which for the first time acknowledged that the Soviet Union is heading for superiority, not parity, in the military arena.

The President's claim of American military superiority is contradicted by his own Secretary of Defense, and by the publicly available statistics about Soviet military strength, and the rate at which they are building tanks, ships, planes, missiles, and almost every other category of weapons. His painful justification for Soviet policy as "defensive" is even more disturbing. It recalls a comment by President Johnson about a leading Senator of his time in office. "That fellow," the President said, "would find an excuse for the Russians if they landed in Mexico."

This dissonance is reflected at many other levels. Inside the government and out, people make it clear that while they do not want to be "alarmist" or "extreme" about the meaning of Soviet policy, they wonder nevertheless, whether "detente" has perhaps been oversold, and whether trade with the Soviet Union, or restraint on our part in our military programs, or cultural relations, or American silence about human rights, might persuade the Soviet

leaders to pursue a more peaceful course in Africa, the Middle East, or elsewhere.

In short, we are in the mood we and the British shared during the 'Thirties. We do not believe emotionally in the reality of what we know intellectually. I must leave it to the psychologists to explain the phenomenon. Here, I can do more than note its existence.

At the moment, our favorite and most desperate denial device is our touching faith that the pending SALT TWO agreement on strategic arms limitations could establish peaceful relations with the Soviet Union, save money, and prevent a political disaster of major proportions. The issue presented by SALT, Senator George McGovern has said, is that "the alternative to arms control and detente is the bankruptcy and death of civilization." In November, 1978, Mr. Brezhnev told a group of visiting United States Senators that a vote for the SALT TWO Treaty in the Senate would be "a vote for peace." And Mr. Kosygin made it clear to the Senators that if they voted against the Treaty, their "peace loving" constituents would vote them out of office at the next election. In somewhat less fervent language, this is the main theme of Secretary of State Vance's comments on the problem. In a speech in London on December 9, 1978, the Secretary said that "without an agreement, our technological and economic strength would enable us to match any stragetic buildup, but a good agreement can provide more security with lower risk and cost. And we recognize that without SALT, the strategic competition could infect the whole east-west political relationship, damaging the effort to create a less dangerous world which is at the heart of Western foreign policies."

It was altogether reasonable for us to approve the SALT ONE agreements in 1972, in the belief that they would be stabilizing both politically and militarily, and would in any event save money by restraining Soviet and American arms expenditures.

Applying the same criteria for judgment, it is not reasonable to reach the same conclusion about SALT TWO Technological developments since 1972, coupled with rapid Soviet advances while we marked time, have made the methods of the 1972 agreements inadequate to achieve stability in the Soviet-American nuclear balance. But in behalf of SALT TWO, the Administration is repeating all the arguments advanced seven years ago for SALT ONE. Soviet behavior and the Soviet arms buildup since 1972 make such contentions intellectually impossible. The estimates and expectations on the basis of which we approved SALT ONE in 1972 have turned out to be in error. SALT TWO would not be stabilizing militarily or politically, and it would not reduce the cost of American security. On the contrary, it would lock us into a position of military inferiority which would lead the Soviet Union to increase its pressures on us, and therefore increase the risk of war.

The two SALT ONE agreements - the ABM Treaty limiting anti-ballistic missiles and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Strategic Arms establishing numerical limits for ICBM and ballistic missile submarine launchers - came up for approval in the summer and fall of 1972, the ABM Treaty through a vote of the Senate, the Interim Agreement through a Joint Resolution passed by both houses.

It is worth recalling the atmosphere of that remote time. It was legitimate then to hope that the tensions of the new Sino-Soviet-American triangle, coupled with the steady success of our forces in Vietnam, would prevent a Soviet attack on China, and persuade the Soviet Union not to obstruct a satisfactory peace in Indo-China and the Middle East. The Soviet leadership had promised President Nixon full cooperation in May, 1972 - an early warning system, working together to solve difficult problems all over the world peacefully, specific collaboration in achieving peace in Indo-China and the Middle East, "detente," "peaceful co-existence," "peace."

Following President Nixon's trips to China and the Soviet Union, a promising agreement for peace in Indo-China was signed in January, 1973, and guaranteed by the great powers in March. We would not have withdrawn our troops without those agreements. Once we had left the area, of course, the North Vietnamese and the Soviet Union tore up the agreements, and threw them in our face. They were confident that the United States, absorbed in the Watergate drama, would do nothing to insist on the fulfillment of the guaranties. But when the SALT ONE agreements were signed, the Indo-Chinese "peace" was for the future. As Congress and the country debated SALT ONE, peaceful rumors arose from the Indo-Chinese negotiations, and there was even a revival of hope about the possibilities of peace in the Middle East.

In the Middle East, too, disillusion was far in the future when SALT ONE was approved. The massive war of October, 1973, shattered the optimism of the preceding year. Far from warning us of that war, and cooperating with us to stop it in accordance with their promises to President Nixon of May, 1972, the Soviet leaders actively conspired with Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and other countries of the area to prepare, plan, equip, and conduct the war. They incited distant states to fight, and to maintain the oil embargo instituted as a weapon of war. We now know that the Soviet Union had promised Egypt full cooperation in the war a month before President Nixon came to Moscow in May, 1972. They carried out that promise, in spades.

In the military sphere, we were well ahead of the Soviet Union in 1972 in MIRVing nuclear weapons, in accuracy, and in the number of warheads. Our bomber force was superior, and we were ahead, we thought, in ABM technology and in our navy.

The foundation of all our hopes for SALT ONE with regard to the strategic balance turned on Soviet acceptance of the McNamara Doctrine - the notion that if the people, cities, and industries of each side were undefended and open to attack, there would be mutual deterrence,

and stability. Witnesses testifying in behalf of the SALT ONE agreements said that both agreements, and particularly the ABM Treaty, proved that the Soviet Union shared our view of mutual deterrence. The people of both countries were hostages, a fact which guaranteed that neither side could use or brandish nuclear weapons in world politics.

We have followed the McNamara Doctrine ever since, but the Soviet Union has not done so. The Soviet Union has vigorously continued its research and development on ABMs. It is reported that they could quickly deploy more ABM systems if they choose to do so. We could not. We dismantled our single deployed ABM system, and cut back on our research. We have no significant air defense deployments in the United States. The Soviet Union bristles with them, placing a serious question mark over the possible effectiveness of our bombers and future cruise missiles, and indeed of our land-based and sea-based missiles as well. There is the same asymmetry with regard to civil defense measures, whose existence is in itself a rejection of the McNamara Doctrine. The Soviet Union has spent billions on civil defense, on the relocation of industries, and on evacuation plans. We have a token civil defense program in which the government obviously does not believe.

In 1972, Congress and the country were assured that the SALT ONE agreements would lead to a stabilization or reduction of Soviet expenditure on nuclear weapons and indeed on other arms. The Soviets are seeking nuclear parity, we were told, and agreements assuring parity would satisfy their ambitions and their pride.

Developments since 1972 make it a poignant exercise to reread these melancholy statements in the official reports of Congressional hearings and debates. In anticipation of the SALT agreements, we had reduced our expenditures on strategic nuclear weapons by 1972 to a rate, measured in constant dollars, one-third of what we had averaged during the six years from 1956 to 1962. Our spending in real terms has fallen since that date, and we have introduced no new strategic weapons systems since 1970. The Soviet Union has introduced five or six. According to the C.I.A., the Soviet Union is now spending more than two and a half times as much as we are on strategic weapons alone. The Carter Administration has cancelled or slowed down a number of new weapons systems supported by the Nixon and Ford Administrations which would have helped significantly to maintain the nuclear balance during the early 1980s and thereafter - the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile; the B-1 bomber; the development of the MX missile as a mobile increased throw-weight weapon carrying 10 warheads; and the Trident submarine. Instead of completing those promising and carefully considered programs on an urgent basis, the Carter Administration has permitted only limited projects to improve existing systems. It has even closed down the production line for the manufacture of Minuteman III missiles.

The Soviet building program was significantly larger than ours in 1972, and it has been expanding ever since at a cumulative rate of at least 8% a year. The combination of our slow-down and the Soviet building program has had extraordinary results. All the significant indices of nuclear power will rise dramatically, even if SALT TWO is finally approved and ratified. The number of Soviet warheads will increase 300% by 1985, ours by 50%; the area destructive capabilities of Soviet weapons will increase 50%; ours by 25%; the capability of their weapons to destroy hardened targets, like missile silos, will increase 1000%; if our cruise missiles, still under development, fulfill present expectations, ours will increase 400%. By every measure of nuclear power, except the number of warheads, the Soviet Union will be far ahead of us by 1985, if we continue to drift.

But even our slight and diminishing advantage in the number of warheads, if our estimates are accurate, would be useless, because of the asymmetry of the Soviet and American nuclear programs. The Soviet and American nuclear forces are not alike in composition. In the past, at least, we placed heavy reliance on our bomber, then on our missiles and then on our submarines. Less that 20% of our capacity is in ICBMs. The Soviet Union has emphasized the ICBM component of their nuclear arsenal. Their weapons have much heavier thrust or throw-weight than ours. They have developed a number of new systems, some extremely heavy, capable of a massive intercontinental attack on our military forces; others versatile, mobile, and carrying many small warheads, specially designed for hitting smaller targets in Europe. So far, the Russians have put more than half their nuclear force in ICBMs, perhaps two-thirds by the early 1980s. Mr. Warnke used the figure of 70% in his talk. ICBMs are now more accurate than submarine launched missiles, and are therefore more appropriate for use against military installations than cities and people. The prospective imbalance between Soviet and American nuclear forces during the next few years derives from this basic fact: Soviet superiority in land based intercontinental and intermediate range missiles constitutes a real "missile gap."

It is obvious in every context that by 1985, taking into account the current programs of both sides and the provisions of SALT TWO, our prompt capability to destroy hardened military targets (silos, command, control and communications centers, nuclear weapons storage depots, and shelters for leadership personnel) will be less than an eighth that of the Soviet Union. The implications of this grim statistic would be compounded by the fact that they will have at least twice as many hard targets as we, each being twice as hard as ours. When he was here Mr. Warnke referred to a study by ACDA purporting to prove that our nuclear forces were at least as strong as those of the Soviet Union. The chief weakness of that study is that it compared the two forces not against real targets in the two countries, but against an hypothetical set of hard and soft targets, assumed to be the same for

each country's forces. This is not the case. The Soviet Union has many more hard targets than the United States. This means that the Soviet Union will be in a position very soon to destroy a major portion of our ICBM missiles sites and other key military targets with a fraction of their missile force if we should ratify the SALT TWO Treaty now projeced, holding enough nuclear power in reserve to make an American counterstrike against either military or civilian targets almost inconceivable. We should then face the dilemma the Soviet Union faced during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and we should give in, just as the Soviets did then. Yet in his recent State of the Union message, President Carter assured us that we have nothing to fear in this realm, because our submarines at sea could always blow up Soviet cities in the event of a Soviet first strike against our missile sites and other military targets. Given the Soviet-American nuclear relation now projected for 1985 and the terms of the SALT TWO Treaty, this is an empty threat - as empty as John Foster Dulles' doctrine of "massive retaliation." It would be irrational for the President to give the order to blow up Moscow if he knew that the Soviet Union had enough nuclear power in hand to blow up New York, Chicago and Washington. Such a threat had ultimate credibility during the Fifties and early Sixties, if the Soviet Union pushed us too far. It would have almost none by 1985, if we fail to redress the nuclear balance.

This is the most important weakness of the argument Mr. Warnke presented here last June. Equality in the number of launchers cannot guarantee either equality or stability of real nuclear power if a superior Soviet ICBM force can neutralize our submarines. Under such circumstances, the Soviet Union would have the capacity to inflict a first nuclear strike against American military targets, and indeed to **improve** its nuclear position by doing so, even if we should strike back blindly at Soviet cities and populations.

The Committee on the Present Danger has reached these harsh judgments about SALT TWO because in our judgment our studies of the subject, directed by Paul H. Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and SALT negotiator, permit no other conclusion.

In July, 1977, the Committee issued a statement which stated that even the proposal we made to the Soviet Union in March, 1977, which the Soviet Union rejected out of hand, was "potentially unfavorable for the United States. Agreement on the basis of this proposal would not assure crisis stability and mutual deterrence; and its terms would disproportionatley favor the USSR as against the United States." Since March, 1977, our government has moved closer and closer to the Soviet position, further reducing the possibility that we could preserve a credible second-strike capability as our ultimate deterrent. The Committee therefore concluded:

> In the short run, it is unlikely that a comprehensive and safe SALT agreement can be negotiated. In the longer run, our March proposal, adjusted to remove its more obvious inequities to the U.S., might constitute a framework for mutually productive negotiations - provided that we meanwhile demonstrate in action our determination, agreement or no agreement, to maintain forces fully adequate to deter attack against the U.S. and our allies. This course would require us to move forward promptly on several pending and projected strategic systems to restore the credibility of our second-strike deterrent.
>
> We must demonstrate that we are firmly committed to a course of action designed to safeguard our strategic interests. Therein lies our only hope of persuading the Soviets that it is in their interest to negotiate within the general provisions of a modified U.S. comprehensive approach.

Unfortunately, the Administration has not followed the line recommended in that statement, either with regard to the negotiations or to the development of the MX-mobile missile and other weapon systems needed to redress the balance.

The Iterim Agreement on Offensive Strategic Arms of 1972 provided that the United States could have 1054 ICBM launchers and 656-70 submarine based missile launchers and that the U.S.S.R. could have up to 1618 ICBM launchers and 740-950 submarine-based launchers. The higher ceilings for SLBMs is permitted if equivalent numbers of pre-1964 type ICBM launchers are dismantled. The disparity in the number of launchers allowed was explained on the ground that we were well ahead in MIRVing and accuracy, and therefore that our real nuclear power was still far greater than that of the Soviet Union. We added that the Iterim Agreement only covered a five year period; that we could not as a practical matter increase our arsenal before 1977; and that with the B-1 bomber, the MX-missile, and the Trident submarine we would maintain our lead even if the Soviet Union caught up to us in the art of MIRVing and in accuracy. Unfortunately, our advanced weapons programs have been cancelled or slowed down, and the Interim Agreement has been extended by executive agreement with the Soviet Union long past its expiration date of 3 October, 1977, despite the provision in the ACDA statute which declares that the United States cannot accept limitations on its nuclear arsenal other than those specified in treaties or statutes.

In approving the SALT ONE Iterim Agreement, the United States also relied on a series of unilateral interpretations of the agreement which the Administration put before the Congress when the agreement was approved. They covered important points on which the Soviets had refused to agree formally: the development of land-based mobile ICBMs; the definition of a heavy missile; and methods for determining the ceiling for submarine launched missiles. Although we threatened to abrogate the agreements if these unilateral interpretations were violated, we did not do so.

The Soviet Union, for example, routinely makes and deploys the formidable SS-20 "variable-range"

mobile ballistic missile which is causing deep alarm in Europe. It is MIRVed and has multiple refire capability. It is considered an intermediate range missile, and thus not technically within the 1972 Interim Agreement. But it can be converted into an intercontinental SS-16 by adding a third stage, or by making less dramatic changes in its configuration.

The United States had a comparable experience with Article II of the Interim Agreement, which purports to restrain both sides from substituting heavy missiles for light ones - a major concern for us, in view of the Soviet lead in this area. The Soviet Union refused to agree to a definition of heavy missiles. The United States offered its definition of heavy missiles as a unilateral interpretation of the Treaty. The Soviet Union then deployed their SS-19, which violated our definition of a heavy missile, and which must have been at least in advanced development while the agreement was being negotiated. We were forced lamely to explain that the Soviet Union was not bound by our interpretation of the Agreement.

The SALT TWO agreement has been in negotiation since early 1973, under three Administrations. In October, 1974, President Ford and Mr. Brehznev agreed at Vladivostok on a formula for the SALT TWO talks. While the Vladivostok "accord" was withdrawn, and has never reappeared, it clearly influenced the process of negotiation. Under the Vladivostok formula, the new agreement would set a limit for the total number of offensive delivery vehicles, including ICBMs, submarine launched vehicles, and heavy bombers and sublimit on the number of missiles which could be MIRVed. Negotiations were stalled for two years after Vladivostok, primarily because we pressed to include the Soviet Backfire bomber within the limits set by the Treaty, and the Soviets pressed to include the American cruise missile program. The Backfire bomber - slightly smaller than our B-1 bomber - is a versatile modern weapons system capable of attacking targets anywhere in the United States without refueling if it landed in Cuba or some other third country. It can, of course, be refueled.

The Carter Administration cancalled or cut back the weapons development programs approved during the Nixon and Ford Administrations, and broke through the stalemate in the SALT TWO talks by accepting the Soviet position on the Backfire and the cruise missiles. At the present time, Backfires are excluded and cruise missiles are included.

The initial proposals of the Carter Administration showed great promise, although they were in themselves inadequate fully to protect the American interest. In March, 1977, the United States suggested rules which would go beyond counting launchers, and limit more important aspects of nuclear power - throw-weight, warheads, and the process of MIRVing. The Soviet Union scornfully and publicly rejected the American proposal. We promptly abandoned it, and came back with a series of offers, each closer than its predecessors to the Soviet position. The Soviet Union made no proposals at all until a few weeks before the 1972 Agreement was due to expire. They naturally exploited what they sensed was the Administration's eagerness to obtain an agreement. Since October, 1977, the nominal expiration date of the Interim Agreement, we have made our own bargaining situation worse by constantly stressing how disastrous it would be not to have a SALT TWO agreement, and how ready we are to make concessions.

According to statements by Administration spokesmen and uncontradicted leaks, the SALT TWO Treaty will consist of a Treaty, a Protocol, and a Statement of Principles. The Treaty would expire on December 31, 1985, the Protocol on a date not yet agreed in 1981, either June 30 or December 31. The Statement of Principles concerns the agenda for the negotiations of SALT THREE and has no terminal date.

The key provision of the SALT TWO treaty is that each side would be permitted to have the same number of strategic nuclear launch vehicles - 2,400 until a date in 1982, and then 2,250. Within this limit, there is a sublimit of 1,320 on the number of launchers carrying multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's) - ICBM's, SLBM's, and aircraft equipped to carry air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's) with a range greater than 600 kilometers. At this writing, there is still reported to be a dispute between the American and Soviet negotiators as to whether all armed cruise missiles should be covered, or only cruise missiles armed with nuclear weapons.

There are two further sublimits within the category of 1,320 MIRVed launchers: (1) a limit of 1,200 on the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers plus MIRVed SLBM launchers; and (2) a sublimit of 820 on the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers. Within that limit of 820, the Soviet Union would be allowed to have a number of fixed modern large ballistic-missile launchers (MLBM) equal to their present force in this category, either 308 or 326. This force includes the formidable Soviet SS-18's, which we believe now carry up to 10 separate megaton-range warheads. The SS-18 and SS-19 are capable of destroying protected missile housings and command centers. When fully deployed, the Soviets SS-18 force by itself could destroy more than 90 per cent of our land-based missile force, which consists of 54 Titans, 450 Minuteman II's, and 550 Minuteman III's, at one blow. The United States now has no such weapons, and the treaty would deny the United States the right to build any during the treaty period.

The treaty contains a number of limits on the modification of existing ICBM's, primarily the rule that any test of an ICBM with more reentry vehicles (RV's) than had previously been tested will cause it to be classified as a "new type".

Limited modifications of existing types of ICBMs are permitted. However, any test of an ICBM with more RVs than has been previously tested on that type of ICBM will cause it to be classified as a "new type." The U.S. has tested 7 RVs on the MINUTEMAN III on two oc-

casions, although it is deployed with only 3 RVs. It has recently been reported that the Soviet Union has accepted our position with respect to preserving the option for deployment of 7 RVs on MINUTEMAN III without such a variant counting as a "new type." There are, however, no plans to proceed with the deployment of such a variant. In any case, the deployment of 7 substantially lower yield RVs on MINUTEMAN III would not increase the aggregate hard target kill capability of MINUTEMAN IIIs so equipped over MINUTEMAN IIIs each equipped with 3 Mark-12A warheads. The Soviet Union has tested 4 RVs on the SS-17, 6 RVs on the SS-19, and 10 RVs on the SS-18. Testing of certain other types of modifications will also cause an ICBM to be classed as a "new type." The sides have agreed that each side will be permitted to flight test and deploy one "new type" ICBM (MIRVed or unMIRVed) during the Treaty period. There is no limit to the number of "new type" SLBMs which the sides are permitted to test and deploy during the life of the Treaty. It has recently been reported that the Soviet side has requested a further exemption from the "new type" rule for missiles smaller than the missiles they would replace. Because of the delays in our MX program, however, there is no possibility that the United States can deploy a "new-type" ICBM prior to the expiration of the Treaty.

The Soviet Union has made great progress in fractionating its warheads, including those targeted against Europe which do not come under the treaty. There is agreement that the treaty should establish a limit of 14 RV's per missile for submarine-launched missiles. There is no agreement as yet for the number of cruise missiles on a single aircraft.

United States B-52's including those in storage and our 4 B-1 test aircraft and Soviet Bisons and Bears are to be counted as heavy bombers for purposes of the treaty. The Soviet Backfire bomber, much discussed in the negotiations, will not be counted, although it is capable of reaching targets throughout the United States, and is being produced steadily.

The treaty does not attempt to limit the number of missiles or warheads which may be produced and stored. Any "reductions" in the Soviet-deployed nuclear force required by the treaty need not result in the destruction of the weapons, but only their transference to a warehouse.

Both sides have agreed that neither side will take any action which would circumvent the purposes of the agreement. This provision raises serious problems with regard to the possible transfer of cruise missiles or cruise-missile technology to our allies. Whether this question has been satisfactorily resolved in the negotiations is not now clear. Similarly, there is agreement that each side would refrain from interfering with the other side's national means of verification. Here, too damaging controversies have already developed, particularly with regard to Soviet encoding of "telemetry," which would enable them to circumvent our monitoring devices.

The protocol would ban the flight testing or deployment of mobile ICMB's and the deployment of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles with a greater range than 600 kilometers during a three-year period. At this time, the provisions with respect to ground-and sea-launched cruise missiles, of special concern to our NATO allies, are reported to be still under negotiation.

From the layman's point of view, there are two basic objections to the Treaty now in prospect, one technical and the other political. The technical objection is that the Treaty would lock us into a position of inferiority in the nuclear balance, and deny us the only available means to restore that balance quickly, during the tense and difficult period between now and 1985, when the credibility of our nuclear deterrent is in doubt. The political objection is that the effect of a SALT TWO Treaty would be to reassure the Administration and public opinion about our immunity from Soviet coercion, and to make it more difficult to obtain the appropriations necessary to restore and maintain our nuclear and conventional deterrent forces

As Mr. Warnke made clear to you last June, the Administration case for SALT TWO rests on the proposition that the emerging Soviet capacity to destroy our hardened ICBM silos is not really a matter of concern because we could respond by destroying their people and their cities from our submarines. I have already discussed this argument. The possibility of our using submarine launched missiles to attack Soviet cities, always dubious, is now rapidly close to the margin of futility.

In addition, SALT TWO would inhibit us from reestablishing our second-strike capability against hardened military targets - in the current state of the nuclear balance, the retaliatory possibility which has the most credibility as a deterrent, and as an option for action if deterrence fails.

To deal with the threat of a Soviet first-strike capacity, and to restore the strategic balance generally by the early 1980's, will not be easy or cheap. The President's decisions to cancel or delay the B-1 bomber, the MX missile, and the Trident submarine make it nearly impossible for those weapons to be available before the late 1980's, even assuming that the decisions against them are reversed. It probably would take nearly as long, and cost nearly as much, to deal with the problem in the short run by reviving the production of Minuteman III's (or B-52's). The Minuteman III production line has been closed recently. And a crash program along these lines, or its equivalent, would be prevented by the numerical ceilings established in SALT TWO.

At this time, it seems probable that the Treaty would also prevent the United States from adopting the only feasible "quick fix" for dealing with the problem, the promising plan for deploying missiles using a multiple aim-point system (MAPS), the so-called "shell game." It has recently been named the Multiple Vertical Protective Shelter (MVPS)

System. Under this proposal, the United States would construct a large number of vertical protective shelters, each capable of holding an ICBM and its launcher. Some would be empty. The missiles would be moved periodically, to make a first-strike against them highly problematical. According to reports, the Soviet Union has rejected an American inquiry about the compatibility of this idea with the treaty.

These are the basic reasons why critics have said that SALT TWO would freeze us in a position of inferiority, and deny us an opportunity to redress the balance before the critical period of the early 1980's, when all the indices would have turned against us.

I remarked earlier that the military assumptions on the basis of which we ratified the SALT ONE agreements have now turned out to be in error. Let me recapitulate those points, to underline their importance.

First, and most basic, we have continued to live by the McNamara Doctrine of mutual assured destruction; the Soviets have not. This fact permeates every aspect of the problem, and completely alters the nature of deterrence.

Secondly, the Soviet Union has moved ahead rapidly in MIRVing their missiles, and improving their accuracy. These two changes bring out the increasing irrelevance of the measures of nuclear equality used in SALT TWO. The Treaty regulates the number of deployed launchers - which, by the way, are not thus far defined in the Treaty, because they are difficult to distinguish from boosters. The real measures of effective nuclear power must deal also with the number of warheads, the throw-weight of missiles, and their destructive power for various uses. The Soviet Union now regularly deploys land-based intercontinental missiles, with as many as 8-10 warheads, although ours are equipped with no more than 3. We know also that the most warheads in the Soviet arsenal have more than 20 times the destructive power of Poseidon warheads, our most numerous type.

Third, our earlier advantage in bombers is rapidly disappearing, due to the development of the Soviet Backfire, the cancellation of our B-1 bomber, and the development of Soviet passive and active defenses.

Fourth, there are disquieting reports of Soviet progress both in anti-submarine warfare and in the development of anti-satellite weapons. The significance of these reports requires no emphasis. The cancellation of B-1 production and the approaching vulnerability of our land-based ICBMs puts more and more responsibility on our submarine fleet. And our satellites are critical both to the possibility of verifying compliance with SALT TWO, and to many other functions of our military intelligence.

Fifth, the development of Soviet missile and conventional force programs has increased the threat to Western Europe astronomically. It brings within reach the Soviet strategic goal of separating Europe from the United States, and achieving the neutralization of Europe, the liquidation of NATO, and the withdrawal of the United States from Europe and the Mediterranean. Such a catastrophe would lead Japan and China to draw the necessary conclusions, and result in the complete isolation of the United States.

Finally, the past few years have witnessed the development of Soviet capacity to fire missiles from factories, warehouses, or other "soft" launchers. The Soviet Union is now deploying between 100 to 200 missiles a year as replacements for older systems.

What these developments mean, in the context of the SALT TWO problem, is that technological developments have made the SALT ONE approach obsolete. Restrictions on the number of deployed launchers can no longer serve as a rough and ready index of real nuclear power. SALT TWO is measuring the wrong things. Its rules could not assure stability and equality or "parity" in the nuclear relation between the Soviet Union and the United States. No situation can be considered stable if it can be changed in hours by the movement of missiles from warehouses to launchers; by the firing of missiles from warehouses or factories; or, indeed, by the transformation of an intermediate range Soviet missile into an intercontinental missile by adding a booster. At this stage of nuclear technology, national means of verification cannot monitor most of the important variables of nuclear power. Accepting the SALT TWO approach would serve only to delay our recognition of the real situation during the short period we have left to restore our basic defenses.

In short, all the cards in the nuclear deck are now jokers.

In 1972, it was urged that the agreed ceilings for some launchers in the Interim Agreement did no great harm. Our second strike capability was still credible - for some threats - because we were ahead in MIRVing and accuracy, and in bombers, and therefore in real nuclear power, despite the Soviet advantage in the number of launchers and in throw-weight. This is not the case in 1979. The Soviet Union has at least narrowed our lead, and perhaps caught up with us in MIRVing and in accuracy, and translated its advantage in throw weight into an ominous threat to our military targets. The Soviet Union is far stronger today and will be even further ahead tomorrow, in accurate, MIRVed, heavy throw weight ICBMs of enormous destructive power. A small fraction of that force could destroy our ICBMs and other vital military targets. Our advantage in bombers is fading fast because of our cancellation of the B-1, the development of the Soviet Backfire, and the strength of Soviet active and passive air defense measures.

The net result is to put an enormous question mark over our second strike capability, which should always be clear and credible beyond peradventure of doubt. Could the strength of the Soviet ICBM force neutralize our submarines and perhaps our bombers as well? That is a key question.

Paul Nitze remarked recently that the "the SALT experience reflects a basic antithesis. A colleague likens the transactional relation to court-

ship between a rich bachelor and an acquisitive beauty - each aspiring to wedlock, but he for matrimony and she with alimony in mind. Both sides in SALT want a pact but for discrepant aims - our side to neutralize the nuclear strategic factor overhanging international politics, the other side to nail down strategic primacy so as to be in position to direct the course of international politics.

"To be sure, SALT is not the source of all our troubles. The B-1 bomber cancellation, slippage in our TRIDENT and MX programs, and waffling on neutron technology - to name three instances - are not attributable to the SALT connection. Yet a tendency exemplified in them is common to our SALT approach - a tendency to subordinate security policies to hopes for advancing arms control rather than shaping arms control policies to our security needs."

In the light of what has happened since SALT ONE, I conclude that we should judge SALT TWO in the terms of President Kennedy's wry comment: "If you are cheated once, it is their fault. But if you are cheated twice, it is yours."

The Administration's ultimate argument in favor of obtaining a SALT Treaty is an argument unworthy of Americans. It is an argument of fear - that even a bad SALT Treaty is better than no Treaty at all. We are told that if we reject the Treaty now in prospect the Soviet Union would accelerate its present military building programs, and behave even more aggressively in international politics. SALT, Administration spokesmen say, is the only "positive" element in the Soviet-American relationship, and the rejection of SALT would set back the possibilities of a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union for years to come.

If the SALT negotiations are the only "positive" element in the Soviet-American relationship, should that fact give rise to the suspicion that the Soviet Union is using the SALT negotiation as a device to lull us while they proceed to achieve a position of irreversible superiority, and consolidate an empire on an unchallengeable scale?

But the whole idea is a profound illusion. The Soviet Union's drive for dominion has been proceeding at an accelerating pace for years, limited not by SALT but by its calculation of what the American response would be to each of its successive moves on the chess board of world politics. The leaders of the Soviet Union stop when they confront unacceptable risk. Only we cling to the myth that the "detente" we proclaimed in 1972 has any substance. The Soviets openly talk of it as a tactic, a strategem. "Negotiation" has not been substituted for "confrontation"; the Cold War is not over, but worse than ever. Of course the Soviet Union could deploy many missiles now housed in warehouses, and put more war-heads on the heavy-throw weight missiles it possesses in such abundance. But such actions would only force us to confront the reality now concealed by the limitations and uncertainties of our intelligance, and by our unwillingness to face the world as it is. Can the Soviet Union increase its nuclear arsenal more rapidly than its present rate of 8% a year? It is doubtful that it could do much better, without reducing other components of its military program. In any event, we have the economic power to meet the Soviet challenge, once we acknowledge it for what it is.

If the Senate rejects the SALT TWO agreements, it would mean that we have finally reached a national consensus on the nature and implications of the Soviet policy of expansion and of the military build-up which is its motor. On that basis, and only on that basis, we could rapidly develop the political and military programs required to deal with the problem.

However passive and bemused American opinion may seem today, the ultimate political reality is quite different. The American people will rise to the task with passion when they realize what the Soviet Union is doing and trying to do. We shall never submit to Soviet domination in the pattern Finland and Poland must accept. If our moment of awakening comes too late, there will be nothing left to do but fight, no matter what the odds may be. That is the psychological truth the Soviet leaders should never ignore.

The course of wisdom in our policy is to confront the unpleasant reality now, while it is still feasible to protect our national interests in peace by effective military deterrence and political programs of alliance solidarity. The debate over the ratification of SALT TWO offers us the best possible opportunity for achieving this decisive turn in American opinion and policy. We cannot afford to delay, and hesitate and wonder any longer. Irreversible changes in the structure of world politics are taking place. If we allow them to happen, we shall face a time of "blood, sweat, and tears."

The irony is that there is no need for us to be defeatist about the Soviet bid for dominance as the wave of the future. The Soviet Union is a weak and vulnerable society, despite its formidable military machine. Together, we, the Europeans, the Japanese, the Chinese, and a number of smaller nations around the world have more than enough power to restore the peace without war, through concerted alliance diplomacy backed by adequate deterrent military force, both strategic and conventional. What is lacking is the political will to forge a policy for the world of the 1980s as energetic, confident, and calm as the policy President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson established a generation ago. Only such a policy could arrest the slide towards anarchy and stabilize world politics again.

SALT TWO could not contribute to the revival of such a policy. Its rejection, however, should be a vigorous first step in that direction.

DISCUSSION

Following the presentations by Dr. David Tarr and Dr. Eugene Rostow —presentations fundamentally at odds with present United States Government strategic arms policies —questions from the floor indicated three principal areas of concern. A basic issue revolved around Soviet attitudes toward the possibility of fighting and winning a nuclear war. This included uncertainties regarding the actual extent of devastation that might result from a nuclear conflict and the actual credibility of strategic nuclear deterrence. A most important aspect of this was the political-military significance of America's transition from superiority to parity, or perhaps, something less than parity in this sphere.

This discussion produced a parallel line of inquiry involving "nuts and bolts" problems. These involved the extent of Russia's conventional arms buildup, the potential benefit of deployment of United States cruise missiles, and the cost of an increased American strategic investment advocated by critics of present levels.

Finally, a degree of frustration was expressed over the seeming paradox of proposed alternatives or additions to a SALT TWO agreement. With or without SALT, would not the nuclear arms race continue? Even if second strike capability could be maintained without an arms spiral, would not this fuel a weapons race in conventional weapons? With this constant escalation, was there any ultimate possibility for world peace?

Responses by Dr. Rostow and Dr. Tarr, while not at variance in their main thrust, indicated differing points of emphasis. The basic premise of Dr. Rostow and the Committee on the Present Danger is that America is losing the capability of mounting a lethal second strike because we have permitted the nuclear balance to tilt against us. Thus, they believe that unless and until the balance is restored we shall be unable to reach equitable or safe agreements with the Soviets. Dr. Tarr places less emphasis on the exact state of comparative nuclear power, stressing instead the profound effect of the United States descent from nuclear superiority to balance (or something close to it). In his view this parity has weakened the deterrent value of nuclear weapons for protection of our allies. One result has been that the issue of SALT TWO has become less relevant compared to the juxtaposition of conventional arms and other areas of competition between the superpowers.

Both speakers agreed that the Soviet Union does not want nuclear war. Both, however, emphasized that the Soviet Union is pursuing programs of expansion which threaten United States interests, and that Soviet perceptions regarding nuclear weapons are dangerously different from those of the United States.

Dr. Tarr believes Soviet statements about fighting and winning a nuclear war should be taken at face value. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union does not concede first strike to the other side. If war comes, the Soviets hope to fight with tactical nuclear weapons or perhaps only with conventional forces. However, if strategic nuclear arms are introduced, Soviet military planning accepts and includes this and has prepared routinized tactics to fight such a war. Dr. Tarr discounted suggestions that Moscow shares Washington's view that nuclear war is necessarily an unacceptable cataclysm. Statements of this nature from Russian sources, for example, might be sincere but also could be directed toward American prejudices and could be concocted to undermine the willingness of the United States to counter Soviet threats.

Dr. Rostow endorsed Dr. Tarr's view that rather than fight a nuclear war, the Soviet Union would prefer to have its adversary concede. He stated that the Soviet Union's intention is to accumulate nuclear strength sufficiently intimidating and overwhelming to enable it to achieve all policy goals by negotiation, ultimatum, or the use of conventional force. The problem we face was described long ago by Thucydides who said, "In human disputations, justice is only agreed on when the necessity is equal. Whereas, they that have the odds of power exact as much as they can, and the weak yield to such conditions as they can get."

Discussion of nuclear war casualty estimates involved macabre totals running from 5 to 100 million, depending on whether weapons installations or cities were the target. At issue was the credibility of the threat of massive retaliation. Simply put, is a threat to incinerate an adversary's cities and kill 100 million people over a dispute in Asia or Africa (or even Western Europe) really believeable? Is it credible even in a direct confrontation between Washington and Moscow on a vital issue? Is the threat of one side more credible than that of the other?

Dr. Rostow developed the thesis that when one side (the United States) enjoyed nuclear monopoly or superiority, that capacity to restrain or threaten imposed terrible uncertainty and risk upon an adversary—even when it did not carry absolute credibility. Such uncertainty clearly played a role in the Cuban missile crisis and earlier crises of the Cold War. Contrariwise, with the loss of American superiority, deterrence has weakened under a parity-induced "certainty" that each side could retaliate massively and mortally. One apparent result of this development was American inability to inhibit decisively Soviet and Chinese involvement in Vietnam. Dr. Rostow concluded that the loss of American

nuclear superiority meant the loss of our ability to dictate the level of violence that a confrontation with Moscow would take. According to Dr. Tarr, the achievement of nuclear parity by the Russians has profound political-military significance. To the extent that stalemate cancels out each side's strategic nuclear weapons, the issue of SALT TWO could become less relevant than issues of the balance of conventional and tactical nuclear forces deployed in areas of vital interest to the superpowers.

Moving to the area of arms capabilities and costs, Dr. Rostow stated that the Soviet arms buildup has represented an annual increase of between 5 and 8 percent in real terms for more than a decade and a half. He pointed out that this Soviet activity was especially ominous in view of the large size of the initial armament base and the compounding effect of this increase over a substantial time span.

The Committee on the Present Danger states that America's second strike capability—our ability to retaliate devastatingly after absorbing a Soviet attack—is endangered. It opposes SALT TWO as compounding this deterioration of our strategic position. Dr. Rostow does not believe that the deployment of cruise missiles in B-52s would counter this threat. He pointed out that the cruise missile is still a new and experimental weapon whose vulnerability to antimissile fire has not yet been determined. If this system proves vulnerable, so too would United States second strike capability.

If the scales of nuclear balance have, in fact, tilted against the United States, are post-Proposition Thirteen Americans willing to pay the costs of regaining our second strike capability? Estimating the costs of "restoring the balance as quickly as possible" at $5 billion a year, Dr. Rostow supported his belief that Americans would accept additional taxes for this purpose by a recently conducted Wisconsin poll. This indicated about 70 percent favored negotiating with the Soviets and reaching agreements with them. However, the same percentage did not believe the Soviets could be trusted to keep agreements and was willing to pay more taxes to keep up with the Russians. In the event the Senate refuses approval of SALT TWO, Dr. Rostow was confident Congress would augment those increased defense appropriations backed by the President and Congressional leadership. He noted mounting public concern over national security which could be mobilized to augment traditional Congressional willingness to support any defense appropriations which the President demonstrated were necessary.

Would not a Senate rejection of SALT TWO simply continue the nuclear arms race? With or without SALT, neither speaker was optimistic. Dr. Rostow favored continuing SALT negotiations but felt that the United States must restore its strategic position during the process to avoid the dangers of bargaining from a position of weakness. He saw no alternative to continuing to match Soviet weapons advances with our own as long as the Soviets persisted in an aggressive strategy of seizing opportunities and exploiting areas of weakness on a global scale. Dr. Tarr's response was even more somber. He differentiated between arms control, which we pursue, and disarmament, which we have not seriously attempted, and pointed out that an arms control policy still meant high levels of armaments on both sides. At best, those arsenals would be stable and offsetting. He concluded that even more than Soviet expansion, the inherent nature of nuclear technology was at the root of the disarmament problem. Today's offensive weapons technology requires both sides to rely on deterrence. Only if technology could be channeled into defensive weapons competition could we conceive of an environment in which disarmament of offensive weapons could be contemplated. Ironically, at this stage, deployment of defensive weapons could, by withdrawing one's cities as hostages to the opponents' second strike, be seen as a signal of offensive intent and draw a preemptive strike. Even if defenses could be installed, there is no final solution to the onward march of technology. As long as the nation-state system prevails, the nuclear weapon with spiraling additions to its capability and versatility seems unlikely to be eliminated.

In a valedictory comment on whether constant escalation ultimately made world conflagration inevitable, Dr. Rostow argued for strict adherence to the rules of the United Nations Charter regarding the international use of force. To accomplish this, we should abjure the condition wherein the United States and its allies respect the Charter, but the other side does not. We should announce an "eye for an eye" policy calling for the Russians and all other countries to adhere to the Charter or see the West abandon it. Since the rules of the Charter are in the mutual interest of all countries, Dr. Rostow believed such a policy by the United States stood some chance of success. The alternative, he suggested, could be a worsening of present conditions of anarchy and chaos, and a dangerous slide, toward general war.

The Committee on the Present Danger is a non-profit, non-partisan educational organization of citizens founded in 1976. The basic purpose of the Committee is to "facilitate a national discussion of the foreign and national security policies of the United States directed toward a secure peace and freedom." Its membership is limited to those in private life and does not include elected or appointed full-time federal or state officials or active candidates for public office.

The Institute of World Affairs of The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee engages in a wide range of public education programs designed to broaden the knowledge and understanding of the students, faculty, and the community in the field of world affairs.

WINGSPREAD

The building Frank Lloyd Wright called Wingspread, situated on a rolling prairie site just north of Racine, Wisconsin, was designed in 1938 as a residence for the Johnson family. In 1960, through the gift of Mr. and Mrs. H. F. Johnson, it became the headquarters of The Johnson Foundation and began its career as an educational conference center.

In the years since, it has been the setting for many conferences and meetings dealing with subjects of regional, national, and international interest. It is the hope of the Foundation's trustees that Wingspread will take its place increasingly as a national institution devoted to the free exchange of ideas among people.

The rolling expanse of the Midwestern prairies was considered a natural setting for Wingspread. In the limitless earth the architect envisioned a freedom and movement. The name Wingspread was an expression of the nature of the house, reflecting aspiration through spread wings - a symbol of soaring inspiration.

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United States Security and the Soviet Challenge, report of a Wingspread Briefing convened in June, 1978 by the Institute of World Affairs of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the United States Department of State in cooperation with The Johnson Foundation presents positions other than those reported in this publication. Copies of both reports may be obtained from The Johnson Foundation, Racine, Wisconsin 53401.

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